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China is often perceived as a land of contradiction replete with
economic opportunities and political authoritarianism. With many
overlapping strategic interests, China has been described as a
competitor and inevitable foe, not a strategic partner, to the United
States.' China perceives the United States as butting into Asian affairs.2
The U.S. perception is that China's socio-economic, political, and legal
* Professor of Law, Florida A&M University College of Law, Orlando, Florida; LL.M.
1992 Columbia University School of Law; J.D., 1988 North Carolina Central University School
of Law; B.A., 1985 City University of New York at Queens College.
1. See Confirmation Hearing by Sec'y of State-Designate Colin L. Powell Before the
S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. (Jan. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg71536/pdflCHRG-107shrg71536.pdf; see also
SEAN LEONARD, THE DRAGON AWAKENS CHINA'S LONG MARCH To GENEVA 62 (1999) (noting
China's increasing economic strength will inevitably lead to stronger military power, territorial
acquisitions, and intimidation throughout Asia, which causes unease in the Asia-Pacific and the
United States); Ken Dilanian, China's Might on US. Radar, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 2011,
at A3 (discussing U.S. concern that China may have closed the military gap enough to threaten
the U.S. freedom of action in the western Pacific Ocean). In fact, as early as the late 1800s,
Chinese immigrants to the United States were perceived as an aggressive encroachment by a
horde of Chinese people crowding in upon U.S. citizens. See Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on
Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 5 U. ILL. L. REv. 1386-87 (2008) (citing Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 594 (1889)).
2. See, e.g., Zhu Feng, Sino-US. Leadership Meeting Sets New Directions for Bilateral
Relations, CHINA TODAY, Mar. 1, 2011, at 31, 32 (noting that China has concerns about currency
wars, Taiwan, disputes in the South China Sea, military exercises in the Yellow Sea, DPRK
tensions, and U.S. alliance with Japan); M. Ulric Killion, China Internet Tax: Issues of
Particularism, Liberalization, and Integration, 11 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 369, 379-80 (2002)
(stating that China perceives U.S. neo-imperialism as a new threat to China's internal security,
legal reforms and economic development).
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infrastructures fail to protect the individual rights of Chinese citizens. 3
Accordingly, the criticism is that China's governmental violations of
individual rights are copiously depicted in its controls over the Internet.4
Purportedly, the logic follows, that China's governmental controls over
the Internet undermine the human and civil rights of Chinese citizens in
violation of international law.5 This Article will examine that hypothesis
within the construct of the World Summits on the Information Society
assembled 2003 in Geneva and 2005 in Tunis.6 Both Summits will serve
to qualify the permissible scope and nature of the Chinese government's
Internet activities.7 This limited discourse concedes that there are vast
reaches of online activities which encompass website design, business,
consumer affairs, technical issues, copyrights, trademarks, patents,
constitutional and privacy rights, contracts, and employment. Any
attempt, however, at discussing the China's governmental online
practices in totality would prove beyond the scope of this Article.
3. Some critics of U.S.-China relations are also cautious of China's growing military
might. See RICHARD BERNSTEIN & Ross H. MUNRO, THE COMING CONFLICT WITH CHINA 20-21
(1998).
4. See generally 2008 CONG.-EXEC. COMMISSION ON CHINA ANN. REP. No. 44-748, at 4,
57, 60-65 (2d Sess. 2008), available at http://www.cecc.gov; see also Geremie R. Barme &
Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China, WIRED, June 1997 (indicating that China has sought to
control the Internet via its architecture which limits telecommunication connections with the
outside world).
5. Amnesty International USA (AIU) has purportedly compiled numerous records of
instances in which the Chinese government has restricted the free expression of opinion and
circulation of information in violation of international standards. AIU claims people whose
rights have been violated include those "[w]ho have expressed views or circulated information
via the Internet or email. The Internet, email and Bulletin Board Service (BBS) have been used
by dissidents, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetan exiles and others to circulate information or
protest. . .. " AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: STATE CONTROL OF
THE INTERNET IN CHINA, Amnesty International USA 3 (2002), available at http://www.amnesty.
org/en/library/info/ASA17/007/2002/en (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter AIU]; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET IN CHINA (2001), available
at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm (examining the Chinese
government's closures of Internet cafes and the detention of Internet users as well as providing
several vignettes of individuals criminally sentenced or posting material on the Internet).
6. See WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, http://www.itu.int/wsis (last
visited July 24, 2012).
7. In the United States, individual or public protected interests and specific harms and
evils are defined within the scope of constitutional rights. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564, 568 (1969) (holding that the punishment for the private acquisition of pornography violated
the constitutional right to freedom of thought); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190
(1986) (placing the debate about the right to homosexual sex within the construct of a
constitutional right to privacy); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997)
(deciding that the criminalization of assisted suicide failed to violate any recognizable
constitutional right to die).
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1. CHINA'S INTERNET STRUCTURE
The growth of China's population, now in excess of one billion
people, has precipitated remarkable growth in Internet usage.8 Near the
close of the twentieth century, China's Internet usage approximately
doubled every 6 months.9 Between the years 1999 and 2007 the number
of Internet users in China increased exponentially from 2 million to 137
million.' 0 During that time frame, predictions indicated that by 2010
that number would reach 200 million." Cognizant of the impending
vast Internet growth, the Chinese government at the onset embarked
upon the unenviable task of Internet regulation.' 2
The regulations have encompassed both access and dissemination of
online communications via the establishment of a vast communication
gateway. Numerous government agencies are intertwined within an
ostensibly and perplexing regulatory scheme.13 The various government
agencies adhere to specified regulations.14 The Regulations primarily
establish a pyramid system for international access of China's Internet.
At the pyramid's first tier is a sole international gateway through which
all connections to overseas computers must pass. 5 The Regulations are
supported by the Implementation Measure and interconnected
8. For a discussion about the exponential growth of China's population, see Omar
Saleem, Be Fruitful and Multiple, and Replenish the Earth, and Subdue It: Third World
Population Growth and Global Warming, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1995)
(indicating that China is the most populous country in the world and that in the near future
China's population will exceed 1.5 billion).
9. See Omar Saleem, The Establishment of a U.S. Federal Data Protection Agency to
Define and Regulate Internet Privacy and Its Impact on US.-China Relations: Marco Polo
Where Are You?, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 169, 185 (2000). But see Philip
Tinari, Web Use in China Slows, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2004, http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,
SB109033408265568478,00.html (stating that Internet growth in China slowed due to
governmental control over access points such as Internet cafes and the growth of cell phone text
messaging).
10. Saleem, supra note 9, at 185; see also ROB GIFFORD, CHINA ROAD: A JOURNEY INTO
THE FUTURE OF A RISING POWER 197 (2007) (asserting the Internet has changed Chinese society
because people are accessing information that was previously unavailable).
11. JEREMY HAFT, ALL THE TEA IN CHINA: How To Buy, SELL AND MAKE MONEY ON THE
MAINLAND 133 (2007).
12. Richard Cullen & Pinky D.W. Choy, The Internet in China, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
99, 109-11 (1999).
13. Government regulation in China is innately Byzantine due to China's vast geography
and demographics. China consists of "thirty administrative units, five autonomous regions,
twenty-two provinces, three self-governing megacities" with over 40 million inhabitants. See
WILLEM VAN KEMENADE, CHINA, HONG KONG, TAIWAN, INC. 257 (1997).
14. Jack Linchaun, Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate Between the
Cyberspaces, 4 INT'L J. COMMC'N L. & POL'Y 1, 10-15 (2000).
15. Jiang-yu Wang, The Internet and E-Commerce in China: Regulations, Judicial Views,
and Government Policies, 18 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 12 (2001).
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networks.16 These interconnected networks constitute the second-tier in
China's network pyramid. The interconnected networks, all government
owned, enable the Chinese government to filter communications.' 7
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) must meet certain requirements for a
special business permit to comply with government directives. At the
pyramid's base are millions of China's Internet users who are required
to register with a local public security bureau.' 8 In sum, the elaborate
pyramid scheme of Internet access and dissemination is designed to
block unwanted foreign websites and to monitor Chinese citizens'
Internet activities. '
Consequently, China's government regulates the access and
dissemination of Internet communications to filter information,
mandates Internet user registration and user agreements, prevents
conduct that threatens the state's prohibitions against pornography, and
monitors ISPs and their subscribers, 20 all of which raises concerns about
whether such government 2ractices unduly infringe upon the individual
rights of Chinese citizens.
II. INTERNET CONTROL DEBATE
The Chinese government's Internet-regulation practices of
controlling both access and dissemination of Internet communications
highlights the debate among Western theorists about whether the state
can or should regulate the Internet. Cyber-libertarian John Perry Barlow
advocated an Internet that has neither sovereign interference nor state
regulation. 22 In Barlow's view the state has no right to regulate the
16. Richard Cullen & D.W. Choy, China's Media: The Impact of the Internet, 6 SAN
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 323, 326-27 (2005).
17. Id at329-31.
18. See Scott E. Feir, Regulations Restricting Internet Access: Attempted Repair of
Rupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange ofIdeas, 6 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y
361, 368 (1997).
19. For a detailed description of China's Internet structure and regulating bodies, see
generally Jason LaCharite, Electronic Decentralisation in China: A Critical Analysis of Internet
Filtering Policies in the People's Republic of China, 37 AUSTL. J. POL. Sci. 333, 335 (2005);
Feir, supra note 18, at 368.
20. LaCharite, supra note 19, at 334; see also Barme & Ye, supra note 4; Ewan W. Rose,
Will China Allow Itself to Enter the New Economy, II DUKE J. COMP & INT'L L. 451, 453-55
(2001).
21. See TED C. FISHMAN, CHINA, INC.: HOW THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER
CHALLENGES AMERICA AND THE WORLD 284-85 (2005) (stating that China's Internet blockage
demonstrates that, on a national level, China is a "land of ironfisted political repression and, on
the local level China is pervasive with government gangsterism").
22. JOHN PERRY BARLOW, A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR CYBERSPACE (1996),
https://projects. eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
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Internet because Internet users have no elected government and the
global social cyberspace is comprised of the people and is free of
tyrants. 23 According to Barlow governments lack both the authority and
ability to regulate the Internet. Other cyber-libertarians, such as David
R. Johnson and David Post, expanded upon Barlow's premise of
freedom of the Internet, basing their position on a "power-proximity-
legitimacy-notice" paradigm, and surmised that governments are unable
to regulate online transactions and that it is illegitimate for governments
to regulate activities beyond their borders. 25
In response to the cyber-libertarians, Judge Frank Easterbrook
essentially argues that cyberspace can function satisfactorily via the
clarification of existing laws, the creation of property rights, and the
facilitation of bargaining institutions. In Easterbrook's view the Internet
presented nothing new with respect to the sovereign's authority or
power to regulate and when a property right or prohibition exists laws
are enforceable and the sovereign has authority to regulate access and
dissemination of information whether the medium of expression appears
on the Internet, newspapers, or other printed publications. The
Johnson-Post position was further challenged by Jack L. Goldsmith who
asserted that cross-cultural communications have occurred long before
the Internet and that existing laws and technology were capable of
providing rules for cyberspace governance.27 Goldsmith's reliance on
technological mechanisms to regulate the Internet is also at the crux of
Lawrence Lessig's position concerning the use of code or architecture
as a viable method to regulate the Internet.
In Lessig's view, discussions about whether the state should regulate
the Internet are moot because the state already regulates conduct on the
Internet. In his view regulation of the Internet, or any human behavior
in the physical or cyberspace, occurs through four different modes:
laws, markets, norms and code/architecture. According to Lessig,
architectural design or code provides the most effective means to
regulate conduct in both the physical world and on the Internet.29 He
further posits that debates about whether the Internet can or should
endure regulation are moot because states are already controlling the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996).
26. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207. This position is similar to the Supreme Court ruling in Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997) in which the Court stated that speech on the Internet is entitled to the same full
First Amendment protections afforded to newspapers and other printed publications.
27. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarachy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199 (1998).
28. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 87-88 (2000).
29. Id. at 89.
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Internet via software, code, or other architectural means. 30
The debate among Barlow, Johnson-Post, Easterbrook, Goldsmith,
and Lessig oscillates between discussions of a utopian world of
uncontrolled ideas with individual rights and an austere pragmatism
lodged in market concerns, property rights and state security. 3 1 The
jurisprudential tension in this discourse is manifested in U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. The Supreme Court has struck down domestic
regulations of Internet pornography in the interests of free speech and
individual rights consistent with the liberalism approach advocated by
Barlow, Lessig and Johnson-Post.32 In juxtaposition, individual rights
have succumbed to the Court's interests in facilitating Internet
economic growth via an Internet tax moratorium, and immunity for ISPs
in comport with the economic pragmatism expounded by both
Easterbrook and Goldsmith.33
In the main, within the United States there has been considerable
discourse about the "how," "whether," and "why" behind Internet
regulation. Despite the domestic debates and inconsistent laws
governing U.S. Internet regulation there is a general U.S. perception
that the Internet regulatory practices in China are reprehensible and in
violation of the individual rights of Chinese citizens. According to U.S.
critics, the Chinese government has obdurately embarked upon a path
contrary to the global community, and created a cyberspace replete with
filtering, monitoring, oversight, and criminal prosecution. The pivotal
question presented in this Article is whether the Chinese government's
Internet-related regulatory practices are in violation of international
norms as proposed in the World Summits on Information Technology.
III. GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY
Preceding the arrival of the Internet there has been consternation
between technology and the law. The historical evolution of
communication in forms such as written letters, telegraphy, and the
30. Id.
31. See YVES POULLET, Some Considerations on Cyberspace Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF CYBERSPACE LAW 147 (Bruno de Padirac & Teresa Fuentes-Comacho eds.,
2000).
32. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
33. See Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (prohibiting the collection of
sales tax for transactions made by mail or common carrier outside of the state that lacks a
"substantial nexus"). In order to facilitate investments and free discussion on the Internet,
Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, which has granted ISPs far reaching
protections from liability as publishers. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230
(1998); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge,
992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998).
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telephone each highlight a disjoint between law and technology. The
U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the prohibition of mail, namely, a
1877 circular about a lottery; 34 the disclosure of telegram contents to
someone other than the authorized recipient; 35 and, by the 1890s, the
taping of telephone conversations.36  Technology has historically
outpaced the legal system. Following the First World War, for example,
bank robbers began using the Thompson sub-machine gun and the
automobile to facilitate escapes from law enforcement. A notable
example is depicted in the conduct of the infamous criminal, John
Dillinger, who eluded police using both the automobile and Thompson
submachine gun.37
Jurisprudentially, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
has been contested in an effort to reconcile individual rights with police
surveillances technology. Police technological surveillances, which
have discombobulated Fourth Amendment scholars, have included
technology-related eavesdropping cases dated post World War 11, 38 and
includes electronic tracking devices known as beepers, 39 pen-registers, 40
34. Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75
Miss. L.J. 1,9(2005).
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at 20-21.
37. BRYAN BURROUGH, PUBLic ENEMIES 17 (2004).
38. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942) (holding government use of
detectaphone technology against an outer wall for listening to a suspect's conversation was not a
Fourth Amendment violation); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754-55 (1952) (holding
an electronic transmission to a nearby police officer was not a search when the speaker
consented to the informer's presence and spoke confidently and indiscreetly); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (holding insertion of a spike mike into a wall to hear
conversations through heating ducks was a search); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438
(1963) (holding consent to a government agent's presence and assumptions of the risk by the
suspect was not a Fourth Amendment violation when government agents recorded the suspect's
bribe); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (holding a thumbtack-sized penetration
into a wall as part of a listening device was a search within the Fourth Amendment); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that listening to and recording of the suspect's
inculpatory statements by an informant in a hotel was not a search when the suspect relied upon
his own misplaced confidence); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (providing that one has a privacy right protected by the Fourth Amendment when
the person exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754
(1971) (holding that when the conduct of the government agent fails to violate the Fourth
Amendment without electronic equipment then the simultaneous recording of the same
conversation fails to violate the Fourth Amendment as well).
39. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that attaching an
electronic tracking device to a container of chemicals to monitor a suspect's movements in
public was not a search), with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (holding that the
government's use of an electronic tracking device to gather information inside the home was a
search).
40. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that pen register
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aerial views,41 cameras,42 thermal-imaging devices,43 and GPS
tracking.44
At the dawn of the new millennium, the historical tug of war
between law and technology has truly taken on another dimension. The
impact of the Internet on law exceeds the impact of technology utilized
by Dillinger and police surveillance techniques. The Internet has vastly
redefined the nature of human conduct and technology. Internet usage in
lieu of "snail mail," telephone calls, fax machines, office visits and
house calls is fascinatingly similar to the famous comedian Groucho
Marx's 1943 description of the benefits of radio in contrast to theater, in
which he characterizes radio as "the poor man's theatre" with a nominal
admission price.45 The Internet, similar to the impact of radio, has
created a mode of communication that is both widespread and
inexpensive. Ideally, and at relatively low costs, an Internet user has
access to e-mail, list servers, USENET groups, real-time chat, real-time
remote computer utilization, and remote information retrieval.46 This
occurs all within a massive global community with convenient,
instantaneous and translatable communications accessible to millions.
The cheap cost of the Internet has established a global virtual
community that exceeds all previous modes of communication and has
altered human perceptions of time and space. This alteration is
remarkably similar to Albert Einstein's impact on theoretical physics
via his theories of relativity. Before Einstein, the perception of the
universe was based on the Newtonian principle that space and time were
mechanical devices used to record numbers dialed by a suspect on a telephone does not
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes).
41. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding police's use of an
airplane flying 1000 feet within navigable airspace over a suspect's home did not constitute a
search); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (holding police surveillance from a
helicopter at 400 feet above a suspect's premises did not constitute a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes).
42. See Dow Chems. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that when
agents took aerial photographs of a large outdoor industrial complex, the agents violated the
Fourth Amendment due to the nature of the place being surveilled, the information revealed, and
the nature of the surveillance.).
43. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding the use of sense-
enhancing thermal imaging technology to gather information about a home's interior that could
not be otherwise obtained without physical invasion into the home constituted a Fourth
Amendment search).
44. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (holding government
installations of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) to monitor a vehicle's movement constitutes
a search).
45. STEPHAN KANFER, THE ESSENTIAL GROUCHO 187 (2000).
46. See Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital
Age, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1013, 1043 (2007) (explaining the Internet enables worldwide effortless
communications and greater connection among individuals and groups).
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separate and absolute. 47 Einstein proved that space and time are
interwoven and relative.48 Similar to Einstein's celestial world, the
Internet has fashioned a vastly interwoven and relative network of
computers stretching across vast geographical areas and purports to
challenge "relative" views of morality, democracy, economic growth,
and freedom. 49
The extensively interwoven and "relative" aspects of the Internet
have presented challenges within the global community.50 The United
Nations identified issues, such as SPAM, network security, privacy,
domain names, servers, technical underpinnings, content, free speech,
and intellectual property, all of which globally impact Internet users and
governments. 5 1 The United Nations further acknowledged that solutions
47. See Omar Saleem, The Physics of Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights, 32 T.
MARSHALL L. REv. 147, 160 (explaining how Einstein verified that the universe is interactive
and fluid and that space is more than a mere background; rather it is an active participant).
48. BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE 51 (1st ed. 1999).
49. Areas which have increasing variability among states within the United States and
between the United States and foreign nations are free speech and spam. See Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 876 (1977) (addressing the domestic conflicts in regulating indecent and patently
offensive speech); see also Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Tr. of the Loudoun Cnty. Library, 24
F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Lib. Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (discussing the domestic conflicts in regulating obscenity); Yahoo!, Inc. v. LaLigue
Contre Le Racime et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd and
remanded by Yahoo!, Inc. v. La LaLique Contre Le Racime et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding U.S. law rather than French law governs Yahoo!'s right with respect to
content (Nazi merchandise on U.S. based services)); JONATHAN D. MART, LAW OF THE WEB 10-
28 (2003) (providing extensive list of cases in which States have sought to restrict online
content). For a discussion about the differing domestic and foreign efforts to regulate span, see
DOUG ISENBERG, THE GIGA LAW GUIDE TO INTERNET LAW 263-67 (2002); see also RoY J.
GIRASA, CYBERLAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 84 (Melissa Steffens et al.
eds., 2002). On a global level, the competing moral interests inherent in the Internet was
illustrated in a dispute concerning online gambling between the governments of Antigua and
Barbados and the United States, which was adjudicated at the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The U.S. position was that Internet gambling is illegal-therefore morally
reprehensible-because the conduct occurs in places such as Antigua and Costa Rica and is
beyond the regulatory authority of U.S. federal agencies. In opposition to the U.S. position, the
governments of Antigua and Barbados developed online gambling to boost its economy and
advocated that any efforts by the United States to curtail online gambling adversely impacts
both jobs and revenues in Antigua and Barbados. The WTO agreed with Antigua and Barbados
and ruled in their favor. See Liz Benston, WTO Ruling Details Remain Secret, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Mar. 25, 2004, available at http://www.casinocitytimes.com/news/article/wto-ruling-details-
remain-secret-I 41805.
50. See The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists: Testimony Before the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (testimony of Dr. Bruce
Hoffman, RAND Corp.), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_
CT262-I.pdf (stating the Internet has altered communications and enabled the world-wide
inexpensive distribution of information in real-time).
51. Declan McCullagh, United Nations Ponders Net's Future, CNET News (Mar. 26
2004), http://news.com.com/2100-1028-5179694.html. Another global concern is cybercrime.
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to these issues required global inclusion rather than standards mandated
by the United States, Canada, Europe, and Japan.52 The United Nations
also acknowledged that any coordinated efforts and archetype designed
to regulate the sprawling global Internet network "must be made
accessible and responsive to the needs of all the world's people." 53 The
U.N. position recognizes the "relative" nature of values, the interplay
between domestic and global values, and the tension in reconciling
human rights, individual freedoms, and economic development with
states' concerns of accountability, national security, and sovereignty. 54
Countries throughout the world held two world summits in support of
the United Nations' position to establish a global information society.55
The Summits were termed the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS).5 6 The first summit was held in Geneva in 2003, and the
second summit was held 2005 in Tunis.5 7
The WSIS held in Geneva was an historical, multi-stakeholder
global effort by participants to develop a shared vision of an
information society that empowers and benefits all people. The Summit
participants included over 11,000 delegates consisting of nation
states, 9 U.N. bodies,60 specialized agencies,61 and intergovernmental
See Convention of Cybercrime, Aug. 5, 2006, Council of Europe, No. 185, 23 XI. 2001,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (Convention on
Cybercrime to harmonize anti-cybercrime laws and establish uniform agreement and
cooperation in cybercrime investigations.).
52. A global approach is practical because at the dawn of the new millennium more than
half of the world's Internet users were outside the United States. See A. HUGH ScoTT,
COMPUTER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 12 (2001).
53. McCullagh, supra note 51.
54. Dianna Kempe, Presentation at the University of Dayton: Law in a Wired Society -
The Information Revolution and the Evolution of Law (Mar. 23, 2001).
55. About WSIS, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, http://www.itu.int/wsis/





59. The following states were represented: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Capeverde, Central African
Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Rep. of the), Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivome,
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Dem. People's Rep. of the Congo, Dem. People's Rep. of
Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Entrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran
(Islamic Rep. of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kuwait,Kyrgyzstan, Lau People's Dem. Rep., Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,
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organizations.62 The participants produced a Draft Declaration of
Principles (Draft Declaration), which delineated a common vision, key
principles, and the goal of a true shared knowledge society.63 The Draft
Declaration outlined a "Common Vision of the Information Society"
comprised of certain recognitions, challenges, reaffirmations, awareness
of issues, commitments, resolutions, attentiveness to special needs, and
reservation of rights.64 The participants recognized a shared vision of a
global information society, which would be people-centered, inclusive
and development-centered, "where everyone can create, access, utilize,
Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep. of Korea, Rep. of Moldova, Romania, Russian
Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Rep., Thailand, The Former Vogoslav Rep. of
Madagascar, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
Rep. of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. See Final List of Participants, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/genevalsummitparticipants.pdf (last
visited Oct. 10, 2012).
60. The following U.N. bodies were represented: U.N. Secretariat, U.N. Human
Settlements Programme, Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS, U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, U.N. Development Programme, Economic Commission for Africa, Economic
Commission for Europe, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia; U.N. Population Fund, U.N. Children's Fund, U.N. Development Fund for
Women; U.N. Institute for Training and Research, Non-Governmental Liaison Service, U.N.
University, U.N. Office at Geneva, U.N. Volunteers. Id.
61. The following specialized agencies were represented: Food and Agriculture
Organization; International Labour Organization; The World Bank; U.N. Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization; U.N. Industrial Development Organization; Universal Postal Union;
World Health Organization; World Intellectual Property Organization; and World
Meteorological Organization. Id.
62. The following invited intergovernmental organizations were represented: Asia Pacific
Telecommunity, Asian Development Bank, African Telecommunications Union,
Commonwealth of Independent States, Economic Commission for Europe, Inter-American
Developmental Bank, Inter-Parliamentary Union, League of Arab States, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Organization of the Islamic Conference, International
Organization of la Francophonie. Id. In addition, a large number of non-governmental
organizations and business sector entities, including ITU Sector Members, attended the session.
See Invited Intergovernmental Organizations for WSIS, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY, http://www.itu.int/wsis/participation/accreditation/lists/io.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2012).
63. See WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, DRAFT DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES DOCUMENT (2003), available at http://www.dinf.ne.jp/doc/english/prompt/031217
wsis.html [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
64. Id.
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and share information and knowledge . . . to achieve their full
potential."65 The common vision was designed to promote sustainable
development and to improve the quality of life in the spirit of the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.66
Along with the common vision, the Draft Declaration listed major
challenges and expressed an "awareness of issues" confronting the
establishment of a global information society.6 7 The challenges were
perceived as global in nature and exemplified the gap between the
industrial and developing nations. The challenges included global
poverty and hunger, illiteracy, gender inequality, child mortality,
maternal health, HIV/AIDS, malaria, sustainable development, and the
absence of peace, justice, and prosperity.68 The Geneva Summit
Participants further understood that certain global issues essentially
render Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) irrelevant
for the disadvantaged and oppressed in developing countries.6 9
Cognizant of the challenges ahead, the Geneva Summit Participants
articulated an awareness of certain basic truths.70 The Participants noted
that ICTs are not ends in themselves, rather they are tools which
immensely impact individuals' lives and can facilitate dialogue that may
lead to economic growth. 71 The WSIS Geneva Summit Participants
were also aware of, and addressed, the digital divide crisis between
"developed and developing countries and within societies." 72
The challenges and awareness of issues facilitated the WSIS Geneva
Summit Participants' reaffirmation of certain fundamental rights.7 3
They reaffirmed the international community's commitment to human








72. Id; see also Amy CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE 7 (2004) (stating that one-third of 80 million
residents of the Philippines exist on $2.00 a day, and further arguing that the global spread of
free markets and democracy has caused global anti-Americanism); cf THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,
THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (2000). Despite global Internet access, there is a digital divide
in which poor nations lack the means to provide Internet access to its citizens. For a discussion
on the global digital divide, see James Hall, Poverty an Impediment to Internet Growth in
Africa, IPS UN J., July 21, 2003, available at http://www.ipsnews.net/2003/07/technology-
africa-poverty-an-impediment-to-internet-growth/ (stating that although the African Continent
accounts for approximately 13% of the world's population, only 0.6% of Internet users
worldwide are in Africa and that 50% of Africa's population live below the poverty line on
$1.00 per day).
73. See Draft Declaration, supra note 63.
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good governance at all levels as interdependent and mutually
reinforcing, respect for the rule of law in international and national
affairs, freedom of expression, full development of personality,
morality, public order, general welfare in a democratic society, human
dignity, and empowerment of women.74
The WSIS Geneva Summit participants sought to minimize the
numerous challenges with the recognition of the significant role of
science, education, and the need for new forms of solidarity, partnership
and cooperation among governments, and other stakeholders in the
private sector, civil society, and international organizations. 75 There was
a further resolve to empower the poor, particularly those in remote
areas, to utilize ICTs to eradicate poverty, and to preserve indigenous
peoples and their heritage and cultural legacy.76 The WSIS Geneva
Summit participants devoted special attention to the marginalized and
vulnerable groups in societies, the needs of the people of developing
countries, and the threats to development in those nations.7 7 Along these
lines, the Draft Declaration incorporated by reference relevant
international documents such as the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Millennium Declaration,
the Johannesburg Declaration and Plan of Implementation, the
Monterrey Consensus, and the Vienna Declaration.
The "Key Principles" section of the Draft Declaration, consisting of
sixty-seven paragraphs, is both extensive and ambitious. 79 The section is
primarily a quest for all stakeholders to work together to improve
information access. The stakeholders in the global information society
are the private sector, civil society, international organizations, and
governments.80 These stakeholders are instructed to collaborate to build
a people-centered information society with equitable and affordable
access.
Two years after the Geneva Summit the participants held the Tunis
Summit in 2005, which constituted the second phase of the WSIS."' The
2005 Tunis Summit participants expressed unequivocal support for the
2003 WSIS in Geneva.8 2 The Tunis Commitment provisions also
stressed such concerns as: people-centeredness, inclusion, development,








81. Id. at 16-18 (Second phase of the WSIS, Nov. 2005).
82. Id. Statements, WSIS.
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development, freedom of expression, free flow of information, poverty
eradication, links with other U.N. conferences and summits, closing the
digital divide, Internet governance, development (economic, social, and
cultural), and entrepreneurship. 83 Furthermore, there was recognition of
the need to prevent abuse of information resources, to foster human
rights, and to tend to special needs (developing nations, heritage
preservation, rights of women and children, poverty eradication, and
cultural diversity).84
Along with a commitment section, the WSIS in Tunis recognized the
financial mechanisms involved in meeting the challenges of ICTs.8 5
Such challenges were rooted in recognition of a digital divide, limited
resources, technology transfer, development, and Internet governance. 86
The Internet governance concerns are enumerated in articles 29 thru 82
of the Tunis WSIS Agenda. While the Agenda affirms the Geneva
WSIS, it also recognizes sovereign rights of states, cybersecurity, social
and economic development of each country, cybercrime, spain, Internet
instability and security (while protecting human rights), terrorism,
Internet threats and vulnerabilities, rights of individuals, national laws,
digital divide, national strategies for ICT integration, and the
maximization of the interests and development of developing
countries.88
IV. CHINA REPORT
The pivotal inquiry arising from the WSIS is whether China's
governmental Internet practices comport with the WSIS participants'
common visions, key principles, and the goal of a true/shared
knowledge society. Posed differently, the inquiry becomes whether
China has merely fostered an Internet society that controls what people
read and think.89
The development of Internet regulation in China is juxtaposed with
the reality that, although China is an ancient country, its so-called
modern legal system developed in the late 1970s after China opened up
83. Tunis Commitment Document, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Nov.
18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html [hereinafter Tunis
Commitment Document].





89. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 186 (2d ed.
2001).
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to the world.90 Contemporary China has a commercial legal system
similar to France, Germany, Japan, and Taiwan. 91 This leads to the
conjecture that China's domestic laws should comport with Western
practices to protect online privacy. Although similar to the western
system in certain respects, China's legal system is "a market economy
with socialist characteristics." 9 2
In the United Kingdom and United States, systems of government
consist of three separate branches, all of which provide a system of
checks and balances against one another. In China, however, there is a
dominant legislative branch called the National Peoples Congress
(NPC).93 China's Constitution provides that all the power in the
People's Republic of China belongs to the people and that the NPC is
the highest body through which the people exercise state power. 94 The
NPC has approximately 3000 delegates elected by various provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities. 95 The NPC, along with its
Standing Committee consisting of 175 individuals elected by the NPC,
interprets and has the power to implement the Constitution and enact,
interpret, and amend the laws.96 The other organs of state power,
subordinate to the NPC, include the President, the State Council, the
Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the
Central Military Commission. 97
The United States and China clearly have different political
structures. China lacks a democratic system similar to the West.98 In
90. See generally Xiang Gao, The Fraud Rule in Law of Letters of Credit in the P.R.C.,
41 INT'L LAW. 1067 (2007) (explaining the development of the procedural and substantive legal
system in China as it relates to letters of credit).
91. See John S. Mo, The Code of Contract Law of the People's Republic of China and the
Vienna Sales Convention, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 209, 211 (1999).
92. For a detailed analysis of China's legal system, see RONALD BROWN,
UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: LAW AND CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS, at xx-xxi (1st ed. 1997); see also Alphabetical Index of the Political Entities
and Corresponding Legal Systems, JURIGLOBE-WORLD LEGAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH GROUP,
available at http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-alpha.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2012)
(indicating China is among a significant number of countries which has a mixed system of law
that includes both civil law and customary law).
93. See Organization, THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, http://www.npc.gov.cnlenglishnpc/Organization/node_2846.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2012).
94. See XIANFA arts. 57-58 (1982) (China).
95. Id art. 59; see also The National People's Congress: What Makes a Rubber Stamp?,
ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/03/national-peop
les-congress.
96. XIANFA arts. 65-67; see also Organization - Standing Committee, THE NATIONAL
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://www.npc.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Organization/node_2847.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
97. See PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1989-1999, at 37-72 (1999).
98. Americans tend to view constitutional and common law rights "to be universal, a
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enacting its Code of Criminal Procedure, for example, China indicated
that it adopts "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought as its guide and
the Constitution as its basis . . . in carrying out the people's democratic
dictatorship." 99 This form of proletariat democracy derives from
leadership by the proletariat based on worker-peasant alliance focused
on striking the enemy and protecting the people. 00 The discourse
concerning a world information society falls short if China's Internet
practices are simply contrasted with U.S. political rhetoric. This is
because the more relevant inquiry is whether China's Internet practices
comply with the international standards synthesized by the 2003 Geneva
and 2005 Tunis WSIS, which incorporated the cultural perspectives of
more than 11,000 delegates representing 175 countries.lo
China's Internet regulatory practices are numerous and pervasive. 02
China has held ISPs liable when a plaintiff requested a bulletin board
operator to remove defamatory statements about the plaintiff, and the
operator failed to do so. 10 3 A Chinese province required Internet caf6
users to buy access cards to enable the police to monitor the users'
activities, block certain sites, track sites visited, and filter email for
forbidden content.' 04 China has threatened to criminally charge bloggers
who have failed to register with the government. os In order to secure
blogger registration, the Chinese government utilizes a webcrawler
program to monitor and report unregistered bloggers.10 6 China has
codification of liberty's meaning, constraining all levels of government and applicable to all
people within the boundaries of [democratic society]." See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF
HOPE 86 (2006). But see CHUA, supra note 72, at 13 (stating the concept of "democracy" is
difficult to define because a single interpretation of the term is nonexistent); see also RANDALL
PEERENBOOM, ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW 137 (2004) (China is unlikely "to embrace
democracy in the near future," and even if it does, it will "not necessarily become a liberal
democracy.").
99. See FADIAN art. 1. For the English translation, see 26 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CODES 84 (1985).
100. Id.
101. See WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 55.
102. According to Human Rights, Watch between 1994 and 2000, China established
approximately 60 regulations to control Internet content or access. Freedom of Expression and
the Internet in China: A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
103. See Li Fangchao, Man Wins Online Defamation Case, CHINADAILY.COM (Dec. 14,
2004), http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlenglish/doc/2004-12/14/content400008.htm.
104. See JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET LAW: A FIELD GUIDE 447 (5th ed. 2007) (citing
Chinese Net Cafd Users Must Get ID Cards, SAN JOSE MERCY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2002, at 2C); see
also ANDREW Ross, FAST BOAT TO CHINA CORPORATE FLIGHT AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FREE
TRADE LESSONS FROM SHANGHAI 134 (2006) (stating that China's networks are controlled by a
government that views every Internet packet of information entering or leaving the country).
105. See Bill Thompson, A Little Less Censorship?, BBC.CoM (June 10, 2005),
http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4080886.stm.
106. Id
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deemed spain as subversive, pornographic, and anti-government. 0 7
China has also promulgated the Commercial Encryption Management
Regulations that require all foreign companies, as a matter of law, to
register encryption technology, and forbid foreign companies from
importing or distributing unregistered encryption technology in
China. 1OF
The above regulatory practices demonstrate that China's government
has imposed ISP liability, blocked sites, mandated blogger registration,
deemed spam as subversive and pornographic, and required companies
to register encryption technology. Are such regulatory practices in
violation of the WSIS? In both Geneva and Tunis, the WSIS
participants emphasized that connectivity in a global information
society should be "in conformity with the domestic legislation of each
country."l09 In other words, each nation has the sovereign right to
establish policies governing the Internet, and such policies while in
conformity with International standards should also respect and foster
domestic policies.
The WSIS, for example, emphasized "particular attention to the
special needs of girls and women."110 The Chinese government's
restrictions on spam, as it relates to pornography, comport with the
WSIS concerns for women and children. China, in the interests of
blocking pornography, blocked access to certain sites and stopped doing
business with certain companies."' While blocking sites and stifling
business seemingly fails to facilitate an information society, such
governmental practices are in compliance with the Internet governance
concerns enumerated in articles 29 through 82 of the Tunis WSIS
agenda concerning human rights, the rights of women and children,
poverty eradication, state sovereignty, cyber-security, social
development, cybercrime, spain, and respect for national laws.112 In
2009, when China blocked sites and stifled certain business interests,
there were 650 million cellphone users in china, 50 million of which
were primary and middle-school children.11 3 Also, in 2009 there were
400 million Internet users in China, most of whom were 20-29 years
107. See Donna Buenaventura, China Vows to Curb Junk Email, SILICONVALLEY.COM
(Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/7855530.htm.
108. See BHALA, supra note 89, at 186.
109. See Draft Declaration, supra note 63; Tunis Commitment Document, supra note 83.
110. Id
111. Yuan Yuan, The Big News on the Web in 2009, BEIJING REV., Dec. 31, 2009, at 21,
available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/2009-12/26/content_236926.htm.
112. See World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Agenda for the Information
Society Document WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. J)-E, arts. 29-82 (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6revl.html.
113. Yuan, supra note 11, at 21.
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old, with online usage amounting to 17.9 hours per week.1 4 As far back
as 2006, China's Internet usage was first in the world.'" 5 The Chinese
government used software called Green Dam Youth to block sites as
part of a campaign to prevent the Internet from "poisoning youthful
people with harmful content."ll 6 In the interests of preventing vicious
rumors about citizens and protecting the public rights and interests,
China has also required real-name registration of bloggers in micro-
blogs like Twitter. 1 Neither blocking sites nor real name registration
would be in violation of the WSIS when the state's interests are in
social harmony and balancing individual's privacy rights against one
another.
In both the United States and China, pornography is an issue
inextricably tied to free speech, cultural integrity, and social values.
Although pornographic restrictions may hinder speech, free speech
rights lack an absolute protection in both the United States and China.
In restricting Internet speech China has asserted interests in the
protection of cultural values and the protection of women as
justifications to curtail Internet pornography. Both justifications are
clearly in agreement with the spirit of the WSIS participants to
acknowledie the "needs of girls and women" (among other legitimate
policies)." Although standards and values vary globally, the protection
of women, especially young women, is a global concern. Juveniles
generally lack maturity, full character development, and are more
vulnerable than adults. Concerning women and pornography, there are
the corollary crimes such as drugs and human trafficking. Organized
crime is a $2 trillion industry, with human trafficking representing a
significant share of the flow of organized crime. 19 It is estimated that
tens of thousands of people are taken from their homes every year: 79%
of them are taken for sexual exploitation, and among that number 66%
114. Zan Jifang, Life on the Internet, BEIJING REV., Oct. 14, 2010, at 38-39, available at
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/2009-12/26/content_236926.htm; see also The Internet in
China: Alternative Reality, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2008, at 69 [hereinafter The Internet in China],
available at http://www.economist. com/node/10608655 (stating that in 2008 more than 70% of
Internet users in China were under 30 years of age and China's Internet users used the Internet
primarily for films, television shows, music, accessing the Internet on cell phones, and online
multiplayer games).
115. Jifang, supra note 114; The Internet in China, supra note 114.
116. Yuan, supra note 111, at 21. Data is conflicting as to whether parents supported or
disapproved of the Green Dam Youth Escort software. Id.
117. Li Shigong, Is Real-Name Registration Necessary for Micro-Blogs?, BEIJING REV.,
Feb. 2, 2012, at 28, available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/forum/txt/2012-01/30/content_
422194.htm.
118. See Draft Declaration, supra note 63.
119. See Patrick Di Justo et al., Organized Crime: The World's Largest Social Network,
WIRED, Feb. 2011, at 78, available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/201 1/01/ff orgchart
crime/.
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are women and 13% are girls.' 2 0 It is estimated that trafficking humans
to Europe is a $1.25 billion industry and global child pornography is a
$250 million industry.121 Efforts to curtail spam, filter email, regulate
encryption, and limit business activities in the interests of protecting
women and children, are acceptable within the provisions of the
WSIS.122 Such government regulations find support in Catharine A.
MacKinnon's vivid description from a Minneapolis City Council
proceeding on the impact of pornography on women (drawing parallels
to the Nuremberg trial):
The studies of researchers and clinicians documented the same
reality [as Nuremberg] women documented from life:
pornography increases attitudes and behaviors of aggression and
other discrimination by men against women.
Women told how pornography was used to break their self-
esteem, to train them to sexual submission, to season them to
forced sex, intimidate them out of job opportunities, blackmail
them into prostitution, and keep them there, terrorize and
humiliate them into sexual compliance, and silence their dissent.
They told of being used to make pornography under coercion, of
the force that gave them no choice about viewing pornography or
performing sex. They told how pornography stimulates and
condones rape, battery, sexual harassment, sexual abuse of
children, and forced prostitution.' 23
MacKinnon describes prostitution as female slavery because it
institutionalizes the subhuman status of women.124 In theory, the WCIS
participants would adhere to Mackinnon's rationale in its support of
China's regulation of spam and other regulations as they relate to the
intent to protect women from oppression. China's adherence to
regulation of spam and other similar threats would be in the interests of
the WSIS's focus on human dignity, gender equality, HIV/AIDS
prevention, full development of personality, empowerment of women,
and national affairs.
Along with free speech rights, the WSIS indicated that confidence
and security in ICTs is accomplished by strengthening information
security, assuring network security, and establishing authentication, all
120. Id. at 80.
121. Id.
122. See Draft Declaration, supra note 63.
123. CATHARINE A. MACKINNoN, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? 115-16 (2006).
124. Id.
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while simultaneously protecting consumers and privacy concerns.125
Indeed, China's Internet regulatory practices raise concerns about the
privacy rights of its citizens. In the global information technology age,
threats to individual privacy are of monumental concern. 126 The United
Nations noted that most nations grapple with, among other concerns, the
tension between network security and protecting individual privacy.1 2 7
In the United States, the word privacy is absent from the U.S.
Constitution; rather, privacy in the United States stems from a multitude
of sources such as common law, evidence, statutory provisions, and
state and federal constitutions.128 In the United States, privacy rights are
balanced against state interests.129 This balancing test is typified in
Fourth Amendment criminal procedure jurisprudence protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,3 against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... . 1 3 o
Between 1967 and 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three
major cases that altered the course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and firmly established a balancing test to gauge whether a search was
unreasonable. The cases were Camara v. Municipal Court,131 Katz v.
United States,132 and Terry v. Ohio.133 As a result, the Court began to
balance the individual's right to be left alone against the police need for
effective law enforcement. The result has been a hodgepodge of cases
attempting to grapple with the impact of technology on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The disjunction in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is escalated by Court decisions which dismiss the
subjective bad-faith of the police, while other cases allow consideration
of the good faith of the police to ascertain whether there is a Fourth
125. See Draft Declaration, supra note 63.
126. Indeed, privacy in the global Internet age is a concern of all nations. See DANIEL J.
SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 38 (2d ed. 2006) ("The Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed an extensive series of privacy guidelines in
1980 that formed the basis for privacy laws in North America, Europe, and East Asia.").
127. See Draft Declaration, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129. See Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1119 (10th Cir. 2006).
130. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
131. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (establishing the balancing test
to determine whether a search is unreasonable).
132. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (defining a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes).
133. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (allowing for a stop and frisk of a suspect based
on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause). The Court later drew a bright line in
deciding that a person is in custody and police conduct is beyond the scope of a Terry Stop
when police place a suspect in a police car and drive him to the station without probable cause.
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979).
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Amendment violation. The Supreme Court in cases such as Whren v.
United States,134 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,135 and Horton v.
Californial36 involved questionable police motivations tantamount to
bad faith, but the Court held that the subjective intent of the officer is
not dispositive for Fourth Amendment purposes.137 The same Court,
however, in cases such as Maryland v. Garrisonl3 8 and United States v.
Leon,139 allowed for the good faith of the officer to come into
consideration when a defendant seeks to exclude the evidence based on
a constitutional violation.140  In the main, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has been in flux.141 The cases are inconsistent in
balancing the need to search or seize against the privacy or possessory
invasion the search or seizure entails. The outcome is the establishment
of a balancing test often difficult to implement and more frequently
construed against individual privacy interests.1 42
In similar fashion, China's effort to balance individual privacy rights
and governmental intrusions is a challenge. In actuality, the challenge
occurs worldwide within nations. 43 A cursory and one-dimensional
134. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding, in part, that the actual
motivations of the officer are irrelevant to the inquiry of constitutional reasonableness).
135. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that arresting the defendant for minor traffic offense constituted a "pointless
indignity").
136. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 138 (1990) (eliminating the Fourth
Amendment inadvertence requirement and stating that the subjective state of mind of the officer
is irrelevant and that police officers are presumed to not lie).
137. The one notable exception to the general rule that the officer's subjective intent is
irrelevant is in the area of police inventory searches. Such searches are beyond the warrant
exception if conducted for the purpose of gathering criminal evidence. See Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1987). See also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (in which the
Court considered the officers' conduct as somewhat dishonest).
138. Maryland v. Carrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1987) (allowing for the subjective good
faith of the officer when a warrant is either issued or executed improperly).
139. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-22 (1984) (establishing the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule).
140. For an excellent discussion on the contradiction of considering police good faith and
ignoring police bad faith, see MACLIN TRACEY, United States v. Whren: The Fourth Amendment
Problem with Pretextual Traffic Stops, in WE DISSENT TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT
90 (Michael Avery ed., 2009). Beyond the Fourth Amendment, the Court has limited good faith
in the context of Fifth Amendment Miranda warnings. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601
(1975) (holding that an arrest without probable cause, which produces a confession, fails the
attenuation test simply because the individual was Mirandized).
141. Saleem, supra note 47, at 147 (discussing the historical parallels between Physics and
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and how both fields are currently at a crossroad).
142. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, at xiii (1995).
143. Islamic countries such as Singapore, Iran, Kuwait, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia also
restrict blogger content and criminally punish improper blogger statements. See HART, supra
note 104, at 57 (citing Singapore Blogger Convicted for Racist Posting, BANGKOK POST, Oct.
27, 2005); see also Richard Winfield & Kristin Mendoza, Does China Hope to Remap the
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view of China's Internet-pyramid paradigm and censorship practices
would possibly lead to the inference that privacy rights are nonexistent
in China. Culturally, China has recognized a substantive right to privacy
traced back to ancient China.'44 In addition, the contemporary Chinese
Constitution provides for freedom of speech (article 35), freedom of
religion (article 36), freedom of person (article 37), freedom from insult
(article 38), freedom of the home (article 39), and privacy (article
40).145 China, dissimilar to the United States, has the word "privacy" in
its Constitution. 146 Article 40 for privacy of correspondence provides:
No organization or individual may, on any ground, infringe upon
the freedom and privacy of citizens' correspondence except in
cases where, to meet the needs of State security or of
investigation into criminal offenses, public security of
procuratorial organs are permitted to censor correspondence in
accordance with procedures prescribed by law.147
China's Constitution clearly specifies that there is a constitutional
right to privacy in China, although that right is not absolute. After its
adoption, and between 1982 and 2000, China's Constitution has been
amended four times to accord human rights, due process, and an
impartial legal system.148 Similar to constitutional rights in the United
States, an individual's privacy rights in China are balanced against
governmental interests.' 9 In China, the interests balanced against an
Internet in Its Own Image?, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 85, 94 (2008) (indicating that countries
throughout Asia, the Middle East, and Africa filter the Internet using U.S.-made technology).
144. See generally An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Practice, GLOBAL
INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN, http://www.gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2012).
145. See XIANFA arts. 35-40 (1982) (China), translated at http://english.people.com.cn/
constitution/constitution.html.
146. See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 142, at xiii (stating, "The word 'privacy'
does not appear in the United States Constitution."). In the United States, privacy is more wide-
ranging and has roots in common law, constitutional interpretation, statutes and international
law. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 2 (2006); see also
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAW, at xii (1998)
(describing U.S. state and federal privacy laws).
147. XIANFA art. 40.
148. See Mark Moedritzer et al., Judgments 'Made in China' but Enforceable in the
United States?: Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement in the United States of Monetary
Judgments Entered in China Against US. Companies Doing Business Abroad, 44 INT'L LAW.
817, 823 (2010).
149. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (stating that "[Tlhere can be
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails .... ); see also Russell L. Weaver, The Internet, Free
Speech, and Criminal Law: Is it Time for a New International Treaty on the Internet?, 44 TEX.
TECH L.R. 197, 200 (2011) (indicating that constitutional rights, such as the right to expression,
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individual's privacy right are enumerated in article 40 and include
"needs of State security or of investigation into criminal offenses, [and]
public security of procuratorial organs. . . ." so The Chinese government
has emphatically stated it has a legitimate interest in quashing
dissidents, maintaining social order, and screening information that is
politically harmful to the state.1 st Privacy vis-a-vis state security is
demonstrated in a popular case arising out of the 1989 Tiananmen
Square protest.
Political activist Huang Qi published information about the 1989
Tiananmen Square crackdown on his web site, and the Chinese
government charged him with "subverting state power" and he faced a
sentence of life imprisonment.152 The Chinese government indicated
that although the Internet has healthy and beneficial information, it also
contains information that is reactionary, superstitious, and
pornographic.153 The government vowed to battle the "enemies of the
state" who use the Internet to undermine the state, and promulgated
regulations restricting the "transfer of state secrets on bulletin board
systems, in chat rooms or through Internet news groups."154 The
rationale is that social control through a Communist dictatorship is the
key towards a successful democracy. 5 5 The Chinese government's
position complies with the WSIS recognition that the global information
society should be in conformity with the domestic laws of each country
and that a country has legitimate reason to combat cyber-security,
cybercrime, and to perpetuate social development and national laws.
China is a rather unique country due to its population, and the harsh
reality is that individual rights may yield to overall social harmony.
With a population of 1.295 billion people in 2000, and gowing, China
has particular concerns distinct from U.S. concerns.I The Beijing-
are not absolute in any country) (internal citations omitted).
150. XIANFA art. 40.
151. See generally Steven Schwankert & Jonathan S. Landreth, China Tightens Control
Over Web Site Publishing, VIRTUAL CHINA, http://www.virtualchina.com/news/jan00/0128/
012800-regulation2-ss-jsll.html (noting that laws promulgated in China balance individual
rights against the state's interests).
152. See China Says Provinces Setting Up Internet Police, REUTERS, Aug. 6, 2000,
available at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/08/05/internet.china.reut/.
153. See China Vows to Battle "Enemy Forces" on Internet, REUTERS, Aug. 9, 2000,
available at http://www.insidechina.com/news.php3?id=187292.
154. Schwankert & Landreth, supra note 151.
155. CHIH-YU SHIH, COLLECTIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA 59
(1999).
156. Li Li, Charting Population Shifs China's Once-In-A-Decade Census Will Release
Information Essential For Making Policies, BEIJING REv., Nov. 18, 2010, at 22-23, available at
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2010-11/15/content_312127.htm# (providing the
following population growth data in China in 1963, 580 million; in 1964, 690 million; in 1982,
1.03 billion; in 1990, 1.13 billion).
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based web-browser Maxathon (which means maximum), depicts an
example of China's exponential population growth. In 2009, Maxathon
was among the world's largest Internet browsers after Internet Explorer,
Firefox, Safari, and Google.' 57 With such a massive population and such
high Internet usage, China will continue its practice of monitoring. Even
before the Internet and its population growth, China has monitored its
citizens. In fact, China's monitoring of citizens dates back to the 4th
century B.C. while its huge population dates back to 1600 A.D.1 59
Consequently, the American concept of self is rooted in individualism,
while the concept of self in Chinese tradition places a higher value on
group cooperation.160 A well-known Chinese expression is "He' wi'e
gui," which translates into "harmony is priority." This expression
reflects the reality that, culturally, China prefers stability over
revolution.161
When viewed with the WSIS as a backdrop, China's domestic policy
of "cyber-snooping" comports with WSIS standards. Network security
is inextricably linked to state security due to the prevalence of economic
transactions on the Internet and the terrorist and other criminal threats to
those transactions. In fact, China's enormous economic growth since
1970 has precipitated threats to state security such as massive illicit
economies and organized crime.162 Under the rationale of state security,
157. Tang Yuankai, Browsing to the Max: A Beiing-Based Web Browser is Gaining
Global Market Share, BEIJING REV., Dec. 10, 2009, at 42, available at http://www.bjreview.
com.cn/e-mail/2009-12/07/content_233544.htm.
158. W.J.F. Jenner, China and Freedom, in ASIAN FREEDOMS: THE IDEA OF FREEDOM IN
EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 65,75-76 (David Kelly & Anthony Reid eds., 1998).
159. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 7 (2d ed. 1999).
In the year A.D. 1600, the empire of China was the largest ... of all the unified
realms on earth. The extent of its territorial domains was unparalleled at a time
when Russia was only just beginning to coalesce as a country, India was
fragmented . . . and a grim combination of infectious disease and Spanish
conquerors had laid low . . . the empires of Mexico and Peru. And China's
population of some 120 million was far larger than that of all the European
countries combined.
Id.
160. See Some General Differences Between Chinese and American Cultures, PRE-
DEPARTURE ORIENTATION FOR CHINESE STUDENTS, http://china-nafsa.aief-usa.org/culture/
differences.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
161. Dear President, WIRED 160, 163 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.wired.con
politics/law/magazine/16-10/si intro.
162. Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Political Economy ofIllegal Domains in India and China,
43 INT'L LAW. 1411, 1415-20 (2009); see also Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and
Estimates 6 (Drake Univ. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 11-27, 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract- 1711184 (stating that China is an ideal environment for pirates and counterfeiters
because, globally, China makes 70% of the world's toys, half its shoes, a third of its luggage,
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China would be in compliance with the WSIS in enforcing government
snooping, site blockage, eradication of spam, and restrictions on foreign
encryption technology by corporations.
In addition, China's government surveillance has also been linked to
micro-blogs, in which the government regulations require users to
register using their real names and personal information.' 63 Arguably,
such regulations threaten free speech, yet, were proper under the WSIS
when designed-from the China governmental policy perspective-to halt
the plague of harmful rumors, which damage both individual and public
rights and interests.164 The required real name and personal information
registration for micro-blogs by the Chinese government fosters what
China would term a "responsible" Internet. Thus the right of anonymity
is inextricably bound to coordinate concerns of individual autonomy
and accountability. 16 5 In zealous fashion, China imposes Ann Well
Branscomb's paradigm by embracing the strong position that persons
should be responsible for Internet communications.
Ann Wells Branscomb defines anonymity as the point where "no one
could trace the source of an electronic message."' 6 She linked privacy
law to autonomy, which she defined as "the right to exert some
modicum of control over one's electronic environment."16 1 She further
stated, "Accountability refers to the acceptance of responsibility for
one's actions." In her paradigm, Branscomb seeks to effectuate a
balance between Internet-based communications and responsible social
behavior on the Internet. She essentially posits that there is a need for
guiding principles and ethical standards. She would essentially advocate
for rules governing Internet communications. Her approach of
regulating speech, however, sparks criticism. With the backdrop of a
multi-cultural society, the United States has historically grappled with
the right to free speech versus the right of the victim of such speech.169
An ample retort is that although one person may have the desire to
half of its microwave ovens, a third of its TVs and air conditioners, a quarter of its washers, a
fiflh of its refrigerators).
163. See Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas are Watching: China's Censorship of the Internet
and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 577, 584-88 (2007)
(discussing how China censors and requires customer's personal information).
164. Shigong, supra note 117.
165. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges
to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE. L.J. 1639, 1641-45 (1995) (examining the
conflicts and questions the First Amendment provokes in cyberspace).
166. Id. at 1641.
167. Id at 1644.
168. Id. at 1645.
169. See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS AND HATE
CRIME 19 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court has taken the position that the state may
punish discriminatory conduct, but not solely punish hate speech).
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communicate anonymously, that same person may have to accept
responsibility for certain actions to facilitate a true democracy.170 As
eloquently stated, by Richard Delgado, "words do cause harm."l71
Where morals and advocacy fail codification of law may be
172appropriate.
China's regulations structured to protect individual and public
interests comply with the WSIS Declaration. Globally, Internet
surveillance has become a means of warfare to preserve the state.173
China's position was amply depicted by Jichuan Wu, head of the
Ministry of Information Industry (MII), who once remarked there is no
conflict between Internet access for Chinese citizens and censorship.174
His view is in direct opposition to the U.S. perspective espoused by
Justice Potter Stewart, dissenting in Ginzburg v. United States, in which
he stated, "[c]ensorship reflects a society's lack of confidence in itself.
It is a hallmark of an authoritarian regime ....
The U.S. cases dealing with Internet speech have sought to
encourage free speech on the Internet despite the harm to individual
interests. In 1991, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York decided in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. that an ISP
lacked liability for hosting defamatory content on one of its forums
because ISPs are distributors rather than publishers of information.176
Furthermore, CompuServe, as an ISP, did not know or have reason to
know of the defamatory content.17 7
In 1995, the New York Supreme Court held in Stratton Oakmont,
170. In a true democracy, governments must regulate behavior. See Robert Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991), reprinted
in HENRY Louis GATES ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL
RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 115 (1994).
171. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND
(2004); see also LAURA J. LEDERER & RICHARD DELGADO, THE PRICE WE PAY 4-5 (1995)
(stating that physical wounds can harm, but psychological wounds are lifelong).
172. See JON B. GOULD, SPEAK No EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION 66-
67 (2005) (providing a sphere of formal law and social pressure which encompasses moral
views, contact zones representing advocacy in a free society, and codified law).
173. See generally FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF INFORMATION SOCIETY 52-73 (1995).
174. Compare ROBERT BURDERI & GREGORY T. HUANG, GUANXI (THE ART OF
RELATIONSHIPS) MICROSOFT, CHINA, AND BILL GATE'S PLAN TO WIN THE ROAD AHEAD 57
(2006), with S. David Cooper, The Dot.Com(munist) Revolution: Will the Internet Bring
Democracy to China?, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 98, 108 (2000) (arguing that censorship of the
Internet will cause the fall of China's communist system), and John H. Taylor, The Internet in
China: Embarking on the "Information Superhighway" With One Hand on the Wheel and the
Other on the Plug, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 621, 639-40 (1997) (predicting the exchange of ideas
among students on the Internet will circumvent China's governmental controls over the
Internet).
175. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (1966) (Potter, J., dissenting).
176. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
17 7. Id.
[Vol. 17324
CHINA 'S INTERNET POLICIES WITHIN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., that an ISP was liable for defamatory
speech on its bulletin board by an unidentified user.178 In Stratton, the
court decided the ISP was a publisher because it exercised editorial
control over the content of its bulletin board messages via guidelines,
enforcement of those guidelines, and the removal of offensive
language.' 79 The Stratton case proved to be an aberration. In response to
ISP liability under Stratton, Congress promptly enacted the 1996
Communication Decency Act (CDA) to address ISP liability.'8s The
CDA effectively overruled Stratton and eliminated ISP liability. The
findings and policies behind the CDA were to foster a free Internet, true
diversity of political discourse, minimize government regulation,
promote the development of the Internet, maximize user control,
remove user disincentives, and ensure enforcement of federal criminal
law.' 8 1
The CDA's practical application was enforced a couple of years after
Stratton in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.182 In Zeran, an anonymous
message was posted six days after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.183
Zeran had nothing to do with the bulletin board posting.'8 The message
advertised items, which glorified the bombing and encouraged
interested persons to contact Zeran. His home phone number was
posted on the message bulletin board.186 Zeran contacted his ISP, which
was AOL, and asked that AOL remove the posting, with which AOL
complied.' 87 The content reemerged and Zeran again asked for its
removal, and again the AOL complied.' 88 A radio announcer read the
message on an Oklahoma radio station and encouraged listeners to call
the telephone number.'89 At that time, Zeran received threatening phone
calls approximately every two minutes. 190 Zeran sued the ISP and the
radio station for the defamatory remarks.191 The Court held that Zeran
178. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
May 25, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 929
N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. 2011).
179. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
180. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
181. Id. §230(b).
182. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding section 230 of
the CDA provides immunity for ISPs from any information generated by a third party); see also
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-50 (D.D.C. 1998).
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was barred because the CDA provides ISPs with virtually absolute
192immunity.
The U.S. position of a free-Internet lacking ISP liability is contrary
to China's position. In China, democracy is based on Communist
dictatorship. The United States would be remiss to embrace the position
that western democratic ideas will prevail in the Asian political
governing structures. 193 Contrary to the U.S. position of absolute
immunity for ISPs and a lack of recourse for the victim, as in the Zeran
decision, China takes a different approach towards ISP liability. China
controls the Internet to prevent confusion, regulate content, protect
national security, and promote economic growth.194 China holds ISPs
responsible for their wrongful conduct.' 95 The measures China enacted
related to content were designed to do the following: protect the
Constitution; avoid threats to national security, prevent divulgence of
state secrets, quash subversive conduct; honor state interests; prohibit
hatred, race discrimination, and damage to unity among nationalities;
foster the state's religious policies and restrict evil cults or feudal
superstitions; protect against rumors and disruption to social order or
social stability; and prohibit obscenity, pornography, gambling,
violence, murder, or other criminal activities. 96 Viewed as a cultural
difference, the U.S. approach of individualism is contrary to the Chinese
approach of community interdependence and responsibility.197 The
WSIS standards are not in conflict with ISP liability because such
liability protects individual rights, fosters economic development, and
allows for the exercise of sovereign rights.
China's form of government falls short of atypical. Many Asian
systems of government have been entrenched in cultural values
inextricably bound to economic and political developments and
assertive leadership.198 Charismatic and assertive leaders, for example,
192. Id. at 335. Section 230 has provided immunity for more than ISPs. The immunity has
extended to blogs, online forums, auction sites, parties forwarding defamatory emails,
publishers, and entities that edited user reviews. See Catherine R. Gellis, 2011 State of the Law
Regarding Website Owner Liability for User-Generated Content, 67 Bus. LAw. 305, 306-09
(Nov. 2011).
193. Jose E. Alvarez, Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An "Empire ofLaw" or the
"Law ofEmpire?," 60 ALA. L. REv. 943, 947 (2009).
194. Hong Xue, The Voice of China: A Story of Chinese Character Domain Names, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 559, 575-82 (2004).
195. See John V. Grobowski & Yiquiang Li, Tort Liability Law of the People's Republic
of China, MARTINDALE.COM (Feb. 1, 2010), http:www.martindale.com/government-law/article_
Faegre-Benson-LLP_916960.htm.
196. Xue, supra note 194, at 578-79.
197. See JOHN W. HEAD, CHINA'S LEGAL SOUL: THE MODERN CHINESE LEGAL IDENTITY IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 104 (2009) (exploring how China filters external influences).
198. See ADEL SAFTY, LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 228 (2004) (discussing the
correlation between Asian values and democracy).
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have dominated contemporary politics in certain Asian systems with
leaders who have exercised centralized power with supreme authority.
Such notable leaders include: Chiang Kai-shek (Taiwan), Mao Tse-tung
(China), Kim II Sung (North Korea), Chi Minh (Vietnam), Lee Kuan
(Singapore), Norodom Sihanouk (Cambodia), Ferdinand Marcos
(Phillipines), Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Ghandhi (India), Ne Win
(Burma), and Sukarno (Indonesia).199 In the main, there is a tendency in
Asia to embrace a concept of democracy based on harmony and
cooperation rather than the western model of democracy based on
individualism, competition, and confrontation. 200 Cultural or traditional
values, mutual aid, harmony, cooperation, centralized and strong
government, and charismatic leadership better defines Asian politics
more than the individualism and individual rights advocated in the
United States.
Global democracy, as a result has a distinct sinicism in the new
millennium. Perhaps China's economic and political perspective is
amply articulated by the statement by Deng Xiaoping: "Black cat, white
cat, all that matters is that it catches mice."201 Ideology is unimportant,
all that matters is China's economic growth. China's intent to raise the
living standards of its citizens was articulated by former President Deng
Xiaopng's statement in the early 1990s when he stated, "To get rich is
glorious."202 The WSIS participants stressed economic growth, fair
competition, investment opportunities, property protection,
transparency, democracy, fundamental values, and freedom of
199. Id.
200. Id. at 230; see also B.V. RAO, HISTORY OF ASIA FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE PRESENT
(2005) (outlining the Asia's subversion of democracy). In addition, Asian economic
interdependence impacts the Asian political climate. See Robert Sutter, Asia in the Balance:
America and China's "Peaceful Rise," in CHINA CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 72-73 (2007).
201. THOMAS FRIEDMAN, HoT, FLAT, AND CROWDED 344 (2008). In the spirit of fostering
economic growth, China has invested heavily worldwide, surpassing Japan's economy, and it is
in contention with the United States to become the largest economy in the world. See Lutz-
Christian Wolff, Chinese Investments Overseas: Onshore Rules and Offshore Risk, 45 INT'L
LAW. 1029, 1030-32 (2011).
202. TIM CLISSOLD, MR. CHINA 25 (2005) (describing the trials and tribulations of
conducting business in China). In China, the conception of law is different from the U.S.
conception of law. As one author noted, in Western societies, "The law protects the rights of
citizens and permits those citizens to shape their conduct in the knowledge that the law will be
applied fairly, consistently and predictably. However, . . . in China, law follows policy rather
than having an independent status." James Hugo Friend, The Rocky Road Toward the Rule of
Law in China: 1979-2000, 20 N.W. J. INT'L L & Bus. 369, 373 (2000). Professor Ronald
Dworkin has stated that while western nations focus on individual rights, Asian nations focus on
the economic and social needs of its citizens. See Charles Li, Internet Control in China, 8 INT'L
J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (2004) (referencing Dworkin's remarks made after human rights
lectures in China).
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expression.203 However, they further specified that "governments should
intervene to correct market failures, to maintain fair competition, to
attract investment, to enhance the development of the ICT infrastructure
and applications, to maximize economic and social benefits, and to
serve national priorities."204 Underpinning this lofty lan uage is a focus
on economic and social benefits and national priorities. The Chinese
government has a legitimate claim within the WSIS that their unique
form of democratic-dictatorship is necessary to maximize economic and
social benefits, maintain social harmony, foster economic progress, and
secure a national priority of social stability. China's focus on social
harmony and economic prosperity has legitimacy. Furthermore, China's
democratic-dictatorship is in agreement the WSIS Summit's
participants' emphasis that ICTs must comply with principles of
legality, national laws and regulation, and relevant international
agreements for the benefit of their pogulations and the preservation of
cultural identities and cultural heritage. 06
The corollaries of a democratic dictatorship are the aspects of
culture, written language, philosophy, and tradition. Concerning written
language, it has been proposed, "[b]ecause each Chinese ideograph
carries from its cultural past its own distinct connotations . . . the
Chinese script proved a major barrier to . . . foreign ideas and values in
the Chinese culture."207 In effect, foreign ideas such as "western
democracy" could only reach the Chinese through cultural filters. Such
filters are culturally strong as depicted in China's view that economic
prosperity is possible without accepting democratic substantive
processes.208 Clearly, the United States and China differ in approach.
However, the world community through the WSIS in both Geneva and
Tunis deem that both the United States and China are correct in the
realm of Internet governance.
203. Draft Declaration, supra note 63.
204. See id. (emphasis added).
205. China's tremendous post-colonial efforts and economic growth is both intense and
expansive. China has perpetuated a "no strings attached" approach as it deepens its economic
ties with African countries such as Chad, Angola, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Congo and Guinea. See
generally Howard W. French & Lydia Polgreen, China, Filling a Void, Drills for Riches in
Chad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007, at Al, A9.
206. See Draft Declaration, supra note 63.
207. JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES ON DYNASTIC CHINA 83 (2005).
208. See WILL HUTrON, THE WRITING ON THE WALL 214 (2006) (arguing that China would
wrong to embrace such an assumption).
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